When prompted to explain why you know something to be true, you can simply assert the response, “because I know.” While this might serve as adequate justification to some, others — especially philosophers or those with a philosophical framework — believe this response to be inadequate or unjustified. When discussion justification, we are given a formula, of sorts, that sump up what we actually claim to know: True Belief + Justification = Knowledge. From there, justification is broken down into two main sections: internalism (prospective and access) and externalism, each of which has its own dimensions and take on how to determine what is truly justified.

Prospective Internalism can be described as follows: a belief is justified because a person can believe other justified beliefs that provide adequate support for it. When discussing what justifies the belief: “There is a table,” a person can justifiably believe that supporting beliefs provide adequate support to reasonably assert that the person is looking at a table. Philosopher William P. Alston offers up a take on internalism:

“There is the idea that in order to confer justification something must be within the subject’s ‘perspective’ or ‘viewpoint’ on the world, in the sense of being something that the subject knows, believes, or justifiably believes. It must be something that falls within the subject’s ken, something of which the subject has taken note. Second, there is the idea that in order to confer justification, something must be accessible to the subject in some special way, for example, directly accessible or infallibly inaccessible.”

The other sect of internalism is known as Access Internalism. Using the “there is a table” example, access internalism can be described as the belief that “there is a table” is justified because the person is aware — or able to be aware — of what makes the belief justified and why.

Again, using the table example — for the last time, I promise — an externalist would argue that the belief that “there is a table” is justified because it is the product of a reliable belief-forming process. With that, whether or not the person who sees the table is aware that the process is reliable, is irrelevant.

Using these different means of epistemic justification, I wish to discuss justification as it relates to the game of baseball — ultimately proving that externalism is the most logical and efficient means of justification.

Baseball, as we know, is referred to as “America’s Pastime.” Dating back to the 1800s, greats like Babe Ruth, Willie Mays, Jackie Robinson, and Cy Young have graced the game with their overwhelming talent and drive to succeed. Though we now have computer imaging and instant replay, for well over 98% of baseball’s existence, most of the calls made in baseball were at the discretion of the umpire. Umpires, like us, are, in fact, human. With that said, this means that it is possible for an umpire, or set of umpires, to make a mistake. Some of the lasting images in baseball history come at the fault of an umpire to make the “correct call.” Since, of course, not all of us see things the same (an argument of perception — a fun one, overlapping one), it is reasonable to assume that what an umpire sees could, in fact, differ from what we see. Furthermore, I will examine this through the identification of what is a “ball” versus a “strike,” fair versus “foul,” and “safe” versus “out.

Though there is some debate about the accuracy, according to the Baseball Almanac, the fastest recorded pitch in baseball history is 104.8 miles-per-hour, thrown by Joel Zumaya on October 10, 2006. Imagine how hard it must be to track that fastball. Most laymen can imagine what a 100 mph car would look like driving down the road. Cars are far larger objects than a baseball, therefore making it much easier to track from point A to point B. As you can imagine, trying to bat against a pitcher whose top speed is above 100 mph is difficult. The circumference of a baseball is between 9-91/4”, allowing the pitcher to have an advantage with the speed of the pitch versus the muscle memory and the eye of the hitter. This is omitting the distance between the pitcher’s mound and home plate, of course.

Balls vs. Strikes

That aside, the umpire must be able to locate the spot of the pitch into what is known as the “strike zone.” As defined by the official rules of Major League Baseball, the strike zone is, “that area over home plate, the upper limit of which is a horizontal line at the midpoint between the top and the shoulders and the tip of the uniform pants, and the lower level is a line at the hollow beneath the knee cap. The Strike Zone shall be determined from the batter’s stance as the batter is prepared to swing at a pitched ball.” This zone is to be governed solely by the eye of the umpire. Over the course of the game, there are many calls that are deemed “questionable” by the umpire what addressing what is a “ball” and what is a “strike.”

Let’s say we’re at a ballgame and the home team is at the bat. The visiting team’s pitcher winds up and throws a ball over the plate. The resulting call is made by the umpire as a “strike,” much to the disagreement of the fans in attendance. The fans yell are roar, stomp their feet, and call the umpire insulting names. Could he have been wrong? Well, possibly, but let’s examine: The ball was released by the pitcher in an overhead motion; the ball projected towards the plate; the batter stood virtually motionless as the ball moved in the direction of the plate; the batter opted not to swing at the pitch; the ball crossed the parameters of the plate, entering the glove of the catcher. This is the course of action for the pitch. As the umpire sees this, he makes the decision to call this pitch a strike — justifying what he saw just moments before as it relates to his perception of the strike zone.

An internalist — more specifically, a prospective internalist — would argue that the umpire ruled the pitch a strike because he know that the pitch was within the zone that is considered a strike, as well as was certain that he had called that pitch a strike before, so that must make the whole situation he just observed a strike, too. An access internalist would possibly add that the umpire knew the ball was a strike because the umpire has been umpiring games for 20 years and is certain that hte pitch was a strike; furthermore, that at the spot of impact where the ball met the glove was in the strike zone, so, by definition, made the pitch a strike.

An externalist could argue this situation by saying that the umpire’s ruling of the pitch being a strike is justified because the umpire saw an object resembling a ball cross the plate within the appropriate height and width of the strike zone, and because all balls that cross the plate within the strike zone should be ruled a strike, he ruled the pitch a strike. In doing so, the umpire’s belief is related to the information and grounds on which the information exists — which is a practical means of determining what is justified.

Fair vs. Foul

Another aspect of baseball that is left up for debate is the determining of whether a ball is hit fair (in play) or foul (out of play). When the ball is hit out of play, the play is dead, unless, of course, the ball is struck in the air, in which case the fielding team can attempt to catch the ball. If a ball is struck in the field of play, the defense has an opportunity to catch the ball or stop the ball and throw it to the appropriate base to attempt to thwart the base runner from advancing or make a play to get the runner out.

At any rate, when the ball is struck, it is up to the umpire and his crew to determine whether or not the ball is in the field of play. The field is designated by chalk lines that are drawn from home plate to the foul poles, located in the outfield. These situations can come at a great cost for a team. A break for the team at the plate could prove to be a jump-start to a productive inning; however, the wrong call can be astronomical for the fielding team — especially if there are runners on base at the time of the at-bat in question.

The umpire can rule that the ball was struck past the base in the baseline and landed on the line or in play. Conversely, the umpire can also rule that the ball landed outside the field of play. Now, a ball is struck in the air and bends towards the foul pole, landing in the stands. The umpire, who has removed his mask and trotted down the line, rules the ball “foul.”

Given this example, a prospective internalist would claim that the umpire saw the ball cross the foul pole before it landed in the seats based off of the fact that no ball that is hit fair could possibly end up in the spot that it landed. Similarly, an access internalist would say that the umpire ruled the ball foul because the umpire is usre that he knows what determined a ball to be fair or foul and that the ball crossed into the territory that makes a ball foul, so, therefore, there is certainty that the ball should be rules foul — keeping the belief held apart from the justification.

An externalist can look at this scenario and determine that the umpire ruled the ball foul because the umpire used a belief-forming process to determine that the ball was foul. For example, the ball must have been foul because the trajectory of the ball — after leaving the bat — allowed for the ball to cross before the pole and into foul territory. Knowing the field of play, and that the ball landed outside of it, the ball couldn’t have landed anywhere else but in foul territory.

Safe vs. Out

Lastly, an umpire must rule whether a base runner is safe or out at any of the four bases. This can be a difficult task for an umpire — especially if they are not in the most opportunistic position to make the correct call. If the runner reaches the bag before the tag is applied by the fielder with the ball, then the runner should be ruled safe. Like the other two examples, though, an umpire can make what we perceive to be the wrong call. This is directly related to what the umpire perceives. Here’s the scenario: there is a play at home plate where the runner slides feet-first, almost simultaneously as the catcher applies the tag. The crowd is a ball of emotion as they anxiously await the umpire’s call. Alas, the umpire throws his right first forward — as if he were shadow boxing — to signal the runner “out” at home plate.

Here, a prospective internalist would argue that the umpire ruled the runner out because the ball beat the runner to the plate and that the catcher appeared to tag the runner before the runner’s foot touched the plate. An access internalist would say that what the umpire thought he saw was the glove touch the runner prior to the runner hitting the plate, and since he knows that if A happens before B, then C, the ruling would be justified.

An externalist’s point-of-view would differ. An externalist would say that the umpire knows what separates “safe” from “out.” An externalist would also say that the umpire knows that the catcher must receive the ball and apply the tag before the runner touches the plate in order to be called “out.” So, in essence, because the umpire knows what constitutes being “safe” and “out,” he made the correct call based off what he thought he saw during the play.

Conclusion

These three examples are aimed to show how different means of justification can view the same situation. While all three viewpoints serve their purpose and are practical, to a degree, externalism is, in fact, the most logical means of justification, especially as described though these examples. Alvin Goldman is an example of a philosopher who embraces the ideas of externalism. Goldman feels as though some internalist explanations fail to consider causation of beliefs; or, rather, to say that they fail to recognize why beliefs come to be formed and held. Goldman focuses on the reliability of belief-formation, or the tendency of a process to produce true beliefs. To Goldman, access internalism is simply not enough.

I understand the use of internalism when discussing justification, however I argue that it is incomplete. Access internalism, for example, holds beliefs apart from justification, which, to me, is nonsensical. Carl Ginet, an internalist, has a discussion of a disinterested justification:

“It is not the fact that there is smoke rising from the forest that justifies S in being confident that there is fire in the forest but rather such facts as that S is confident that he sees smoke, S has no reason to mistrust his sight on this particular matter at this particular time, and S seems to remember that he has come to know that virtually always when there is smoke of the sort he sees that there is fire.”

This idea makes sense. Here, Ginet is saying that it is not the fact that we know that 3+3=9 that justifies a person to be confident in knowing this, rather that the person confidently remembers that he learned that 3+3=9 is more important.

I can see why this form of internalism would serve in some capacity, but I respectfully disagree that internalism, even in this form, is as efficient as externalism. Yes, externalism is loose in some regards, but I feel that is the form that best fits epistemic justification.

[First drafted on 05/06/09]